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Institutional complementarity refers to situations of interdependence among institutions. This concept is frequently used to explain the degree of institutional diversity that can be observed across and within socio-economic systems, and its consequences on economic performance. In particular, the concept of institutional complementarity has been used to illustrate why institutions are resistant to change and why introducing new institutions into a system often leads to unintended, sometimes suboptimal, consequences.〔Gagliardi, F. (2014). A Bibliometric Analysis of the Literature on Institutional Complementarities, ''Mimeo''.〕 Approaches, based on the concept of institutional complementarities, have found applications across a wide range of institutional spheres, going from firm governance and industrial relations to varieties of capitalism and political reforms. Formal models have also been developed to study the nature and consequences of institutional complementarity. After a brief description of the canonical formal representation of institutional complementarity, the most relevant domains of applications will be discussed. ==Models of institutional complementarity== The concept of institutional complementarity has deep roots in the social sciences.〔Lachmann, L.M. (1979), The legacy of Max Weber, Heinemann, London.〕 Whereas the sociological approach of the interdependence of different institutions has left the actions of the individuals largely outside the analysis, the modern approach, developed mainly by economists, has been based on the analysis of the constraints facing the actions of the individuals acting in different domains of choice. This approach has found applications across a wide range of institutional spheres, going from firm governance and industrial relations to varieties of capitalism and political reforms. Formal models have also been developed to study the nature and consequences of institutional complementarity. The canonical model of institutional complementarity is due to Masahiko Aoki〔Aoki, M. (2001), Towards a comparative institutional analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge.〕 and relies on the theory of supermodular games developed by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts.〔Milgrom P, Roberts J (1990) Rationalizability, lerning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities. Econometrica 58(6): 1255–1277.〕 The basic structure of the model takes the following form. Let us consider a setting with two institutional domains, and , and two sets of agents, and that do not directly interact with each other. Nevertheless, an institution implemented in one domain parametrically affects the consequences of the actions taken in the other domain. For instance, can be associated with the type of ownership structure prevailing in a given country and with the structure of labour rights. For simplicity we assume that the technological and natural environment is constant. Suppose that the agents in domain can choose a rule from two alternative options: and ; similarly, agents in domain can choose a rule from either or . For simplicity, let us assume that all agents in each domain have an identical payoff function or defined on binary choice sets of their own, either or , with another sets as the set of parameters. We say that an (endogenous) “rule” is institutionalized in a domain when it is implemented as an equilibrium choice of agents in the relevant domains. Suppose that the following conditions hold: : : for all and . The latter are the so-called supermodular (complementarity) conditions. The first condition implies that the “incremental” benefit for the agents in from choosing rather than increases as their institutional environment in is rather than . The second condition implies that the incremental benefit for agents in from choosing rather than increases if their institutional environment in is rather than . Note that these conditions are concerned with the property of incremental payoffs with respect to a change in a parameter value. They do not exclude the possibility that the level of payoff of one rule is strictly higher than that of the other for the agents of one or both domain(s) regardless of the choice of rule in the other domain. In such a case the preferred rule(s) will be implemented autonomously in the relevant domain, while the agents in the other domain will choose the rule that maximizes their payoffs in response to their institutional environment. Then the equilibrium of the system comprising and – and thus the institutional arrangement across them – is uniquely determined by preference (technology). However, there can also be cases in which neither rule dominates the other in either domain in the sense described above. If so, the agents in both domains need to take into account which rule is institutionalized in the other domain. Under the supermodularity condition there can then be two pure Nash equilibria (institutional arrangements) for the system comprising and , namely and . When such multiple equilibria exist, we say that and , as well as and , are “institutional complements”. If institutional complementarity exists, each institutional arrangement characterizes as a self-sustaining equilibrium where no agent has an inventive to deviate. It terms of welfare, it may be the case that possible overall institutional arrangements are not mutually Pareto comparable, or that one of them could be even Pareto suboptimal to the other. In these cases history is the main force determining which type of institutional arrangements is likely to emerge, with the consequence that suboptimal outcomes are possible. Suppose for instance that is a Pareto-superior institutional arrangement in which and . However, for some historical reason is chosen in domain and becomes an institutional environment for domain . Faced with this institutional environment agents in domain will correspondingly react by choosing reason . Thus the Pareto-suboptimal institutional arrangement will result. This is an instance of coordination failure in the presence of indivisibility. Obviously, there can also be cases where but . This is an instance where the two viable institutional arrangements cannot be Pareto ranked. Agents exhibit conflicting interests in the two equilibria and the emergence of one institutional arrangement as opposed to the other may depend on the distribution of decisional power. If for some reasons agents choosing in domain A have the power to select and enforce their preferred rule, arrangement is the most likely outcome. Alternatively, agents choosing in domain B will force the society to adopt . 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Institutional complementarity」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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